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Maxim Rozumny

Putin's Grand Strategy and Its Implementation in the Invasion Ukraine 2022

Author: Maxim Rozumny,

Doctor of Political Science,

Pretoria, South Africa

Mail to: rozumnyi@gmail.com



Conclusions


The content of a Grand Strategy is determined by the nature of the subject that operates it and implements its fundamental interests in this way. In the case of the Putin regime, we see an example of the formation of a fictitious entity - a strong leader with ambitious tasks of a historical scale, behind which are actually hidden the local interests of survival and staying in power of a narrow corporation that controls the state and main resources in the Russian Federation.


Therefore, it will be quite logical to predict that the goals of the collective Putin, which are officially or publicly declared by the regime and its mouthpieces, are the same imitation as the artificial charisma of the Russian leader.


Based on the results of the first year of armed confrontation, it is obvious that Putin did not achieve the expected results in all aspects of his declared goals.

Instead of the "denazification" of Ukraine, there was a patriotic mobilization and the cleansing of most public areas in this country from Russian agents.

Instead of its "demilitarization" – a qualitative and quantitative increase in military capabilities, the transformation of the Ukrainian armed forces into a central institution of national statehood and an influential factor in European politics.

The issue of Crimea not only returned to the agenda, but also received an international consensus regarding its solution in favor of Ukraine.

The escalation of hostilities in Donbas does not protect the local population, as Putin promised, but ultimately destroys this region and leads to new numerous losses.


Hence the need to consider other factors and motives that lie outside the context of Russian-Ukrainian relations as determining the content of Putin's grand strategy.


Observers include the following as the main geopolitical goals of Russian foreign policy at this stage:

a) destabilization of Ukraine and dismantling of Ukrainian statehood;

b) strengthening Moscow's control over the post-Soviet space;

c) discrediting and weakening the positions of the West;

d) strengthening the positions of the coalition of authoritarian regimes led by China as an alternative to Western dominance.


However, considering the situation on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria shows a discrepancy between the strategic intention and the obtained result. In most areas of Russia's foreign and security policy, the changes of 2022 are catastrophic, and the continuation of the war makes them irreversible.


Thus, according to all stated or analytically reconstructed goals of Russia's “special military operation” on the territory of Ukraine, Putin achieved the opposite of the expected result. But this does not stop Moscow, but only makes its actions more persistent and reckless. This paradox leads to the conclusion that the real goals of the attack on Ukraine were quite radically different from the declared ones.


An analysis of the circumstances in which the attack on Ukraine was carried out, a comparison of the declared goals with the actual results of the “special military operation” announced by the Russian president on February 24, 2022, show that the basic interests and real goals of the Putin regime do not lie in terms of foreign policy, but are inside of Russia.


Geopolitical confrontation, the quest to revive the Soviet Union, and the restoration of Russian sovereignty over the former Soviet republics, which are usually seen as the main elements of Putin's Grand Strategy, are actually secondary and often simulated goals that serve as a cover for the main goal of maintaining Putin and his corporation absolute power inside Russia.


This Putin regime requires an isolated, militarized Russia behind an iron fence, in which there is no competitive politics, no free thought and no free speech, in which the economic resources are controlled by the authorities, and the power is in the hands of a narrow corporation of security forces. An armed attack on Ukraine was considered in the Kremlin as a universal and almost win-win way to achieve this goal.


Despite the losses suffered by Russia in this war, and the very dubious gains in the form of annexed territories and the weakening of Ukraine, the Putin regime continues to escalate and tries to achieve a result of the war campaign which would be acceptable for its domestic patriotic audience. This shows that the regime is still on the path of its internal transformation, which will allow it to achieve the necessary level of external closure and internal repression to guarantee the retention of power by the ruling corporation.


It means that the Putin’s Grand Strategy still works and its goals are still available.


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1 Comment


Marc Oberholzer
Marc Oberholzer
Jan 30, 2023

Слава Україні !     🇺🇦🌻🌻🇿🇦


Informative and interesting food for thought that is concerning. #RussiaIsATerroristState

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